The Competitive Effects of Resale Price Maintenance by Gilligan, Thomas W.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA. CALIFORNIA 91125 
THE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE* 
Thomas W. Gilligan 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 562 
February 1985 
ABSTRACT 
The competi tive effects of resale price maintenance (RPM) are 
theoretically diverse . RPM can cause allocation distortions or 
promote productive efficiencies in the distribution process.  
Moreover , extant cross-sectional empirical evidence is incapable of 
distinguishing among the potentially disparate effects of RPM. This 
paper conducts hypothesis tests of the alternative theories of RPM . 
The empirical framework relates estimates of the effects of RPM for a 
cross-section of observations to necessary conditions of the 
alternative models. This analysis indicates that RPM is used both to 
foster cartels and promote efficiencies in the distribution process . 
This result is consistent with the growing body of case study analysis 
that suggests that RPM is used for a variety of reasons . This resul t 
also questions the current .12..fil'. se illegal status of RPM in the 
antitrust laws. Evidence is also provided concerning the strategic 
interaction between manufacturers and dealers in the distribution 
process and the use of financial data in analyzing proposi tions in 
industrial organization. 
I ,  INTRODUCTION 
Economic transactions are often more complicated than the 
simple price-mediated exchange of conventional marke ts. The 
distribution of branded products is exemplary . Contracts governing 
the distribution process frequently constrain the actions of upstream 
and downstream firms.  Examples include restrictive sales terri tories, 
exclusive dealing, requirement contract s ,  and tying arrangement s .  
These and other methods o f  vertical control are persistent and 
increasingly frequent objects of analysis in the industrial 
organization literature {Warren-Boul ton, 1 97 8 ;  Blair and Kaserman, 
1 983 ; Mathewson and Winter , 1 983a , b ,  1 984 ; Bittlingmeyer , 1 983 ; and 
Marvel and McCafferty , 1 984) . Indeed, the economic effects of these 
practices possess impor tant implications for the conduct of antitrust 
policy and the development of the modern theory of the firm { R ubin,  
1 977; and Marvel , 1 982) , 
One particular form of vertical control occurs when the 
upstream firm dictates pricing policies at subsequent stages of the 
distribution process . This method of vertical control is referred to 
as resale price maintenance {RPM) . Theoretical ly, RPM can promote 
allocative distortions in the distribution process by enhancing the 
discipline of an upstream or downstr eam cartel . RPM can also create 
productive efficiencies by mitigating the agency problems of 
disintegrated distribution. Assessing the actual effects of RPM is,  
therefore,  important both for the development of economic theory and 
the conduct of antitrust policy. Extant cross-secti onal empirical 
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evidence is , however , incapable of distinguishing among the disparate 
theories of RPM. Additionally, detailed case studies indicate that 
RPM may possess different economic effects in alternative situations. 
Thus , "nei ther the economic theories nor the existing empirical 
evidence currently offer overwhelming support to any single view 
concerning R PM" { Overstree t ,  1 983 , p .  1) . It is unclear , though , 
whether this conclusion accurately reflects the diverse effects 
engendered by RPM or is simply a comment on the inadequacy of received 
empirical evidence. 
This paper conducts tests of the al ternative theories of RPM .  
The framework for these tests consists o f  two stages , The practice of 
RPM violates antitrust law . The first stage of the empirical 
framework examines capital market responses to public and private 
anti trust enforcement efforts to gain estimates of the motivations and 
effects of RPM. The second stage of the empirical framework examines 
the relationship between these estimated effects and necessary 
conditions of the al ternative models .  This framework facilitates 
unbiased tests capable of distinguishing among the alternative 
theories of RPM . In anti cipation, the analysis provides positive 
support for each of the theories of RPM. Moreover , this analysis 
identifies a set of variables important for the determination of the 
eco nomic effects of RPM in each case.  These resul ts possess 
implications for the economic theory of vertical control , the conduct 
of public policy towards RPM, the interaction between manufacturers 
and dealers in the distribution process ,  and the use of capital market 
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data and analyses for testing propositions in industrial organization. 
Section II of this paper presents the al ternative theories of 
RPM and surveys existing empirical evidence . Section III develops the 
empirical framework used in this paper . Section IV conducts the 
empirical analysis developed in Section III . Section V contains a 
discussion of the empirical resul ts contained in this paper . And 
final ly , Section VI is the conclusion. 
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 
RPM is a persistent focus of analysis in the industrial 
organization literatur e .  The theoretical and empirical effects of RPM 
are also frequently studied by a wide variety of private and 
governmental organizations. This section of the paper summarizes the 
theoreti cal and empirical literature on RPM. Theor eticall y ,  the 
motivations for and economic effects of RPM are diverse .  Extant 
empirical evidence is,  unfortunately, of little value in assessing the 
potentially disparate effects of RPM . 
The Theor etical Effects of Resale Price Maintenance 
The theor etical debate over RPM illustrates the tensions 
between the structuralist and transaction costs paradigms in 
industrial organization. Both paradigms offer explanations for the 
practice of RPM. Moreover, the wel fare consequences of RPM diverge 
under the al ternative models .  RPM can diminish the allocative or 
enhance the productive efficiency of the distribution process. 
In the structuralist tradition, the attainment of productive 
and allocative efficiency depends critically on elements of marke t 
structure. 1 The number of buyers and sellers , product
differentiation, barriers to entry , and other characteristics of 
market structure affect the performance of industries , The 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm remains an explanatory tool of 
many contemporary industrial organization economists. This paradigm 
provides two rationales for RPM .  
The structure of the downstream, distribution industry bears 
on the first structural ist interpretation of RPM. In some cases, the 
distribution industry is characterized by a paucity of sellers or by 
retailers that are organized for licensing or promotional purposes .  
These circumstances can promote collusive behavior among dealers. 
These dealer cartel s ,  like all cartel s ,  are subject to probl ems 
resul ting from the divergence of individually rational and j oint 
maximizing strategies by its members .  The dealer cartel hypothesis 
( Yamey , 1 952 ; Bowman, 1 952; and Gould and Preston, 1 96 5) contends that 
( minimum) RPM is imposed on a manufacturer by a cartel of dealers to 
exploit market power at the distribution stage . RPM enhances 
collusive behavior by employing the manufacturer to police and enforce 
members of the dealers ' cartel . 
Structural condi tions of the upstream , manufacturing industry 
bear on the second structuralist interpretation of RPM. In some 
cases ,  the manufacturing industry is characterized by a concentrated 
group of sellers or barriers to entry.  These circumstances can 
facili tate collusion among manufacturers . The success of the 
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manufacturers ' cartel depends on the monitoring and enforcement 
practices of the cartel . The manufacturer cartel hypothesis ( U . S .  
Congress , 1 952; and Telser , 1 96 0) argues that (minimum) RPM is a rule 
employed by the manufacturers ' cartel to strengthen the discipline of 
its members . RPM enhances collusive behavior by eliminating 
incentives for deal ers to increase purchases from price-cut ting 
manufacturers and by increasing the observability of a manufacturer 's 
pricing policies . 2 
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The wel fare consequences of structuralist applications of RPM 
are straightforward. In both the dealer and manufacturer cartel 
cases , the final price of the product is higher and output lower than 
would prevail given competitive industry structur es .  Factor 
distortions can also occur if substitution opportunities exist between 
the manufacturing and distributing sector . A structuralist analysis 
implies that RPM can create allocative distortions in output and input 
markets . 
Exchange in a decentralized economy is itsel f costly .  The 
costs of transacting can be large in situations where traders are 
asymmetrically informed. Transaction costs can also be high in the 
absence of well-specified property rights . In the transaction costs 
tradi tion, the existence of business organizations and practices 
reduce the costs of exchange . 3 Complex institutional arrangements,
such as congl omerate enterprise and vertical integration, are 
endogenous responses to costly transactions . The transact ion costs 
paradigm is a useful tool for understanding the motivations and 
effects of diverse commercial arrangements . This paradigm offers 
several rationales for RPM. 
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The existence of imperfect information in product markets can 
motivate a transaction costs appl ication of RPM. It is often costly 
for consumers to assess ex ante the quality of products . Deal ers can 
provide information about a product in several ways , Deal ers can 
perform demonstrations or instructional services concerning the 
useful ness of a product . Dealers may also generate signals about the 
quality of a product . Both of these activities can be important 
sources of interbrand competition in an industry . It is difficul t ,  
however , t o  sustain equilibria involving dealer services or signaling . 
In a simple price-mediated wholesale marke t, equilibria characterized 
by a level of dealer services or signals consistent with the 
maximization of all of the dealers' profits are unattainabl e .  Each 
dealer has an incentive to free-ride on services provided by other 
dealers . Additional restrictions are required to gain efficient 
equil ibria. RPM is one such restriction. RPM ( minimum) shifts 
intrabrand compe tition among dealers away from price and towards the 
provision of dealer services or signal ing. The resulting equil ibria 
can maximize the joint profits of the deal ers . 4 RPM can mitigate
horizontal externalities among dealers ( Telser , 1 96 0; Mathewson and 
Winter , 1 983 a; Marvel and McCafferty, 1 984) . 
Dealers can also facil itate the distribution of a product by 
their locational decisions. A spatial distribution of deal er 
locations that resembles the distribution of potential consumers 
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minimizes aggregate transportation cost s .  This pattern o f  dealer 
locations, however , generates a spatial monopoly for each dealer . RPM 
( maximum) can be used by a manufacturer to achieve an efficient 
spatial distribution of dealers while maintaining a retail margin 
consistent with competition at the distribution stage . RPM can avoid 
the vertical externality of successive monopoly ( Warren-Boul ton , 1 977: 
Bittl ingmayer , 1 983) . 
The absence of well-specified property rights between the 
manufacturer and a dealer can also motivate a transaction costs 
application of RPM .  The success o f  the product at retail in many 
cases depends on activities undertaken by both the manufacturer and 
its dealers . In these situations it is impossible to impute ei ther 
the dealer ' s  or manufacturer ' s  inputs by observing retail price alone . 
The costliness of monitoring inputs creates a probl em of moral hazard 
between the manufacturer and each deal er . A simpl e price-mediated 
wholesale marke t results in the manufacturer and deal ers supplying 
inputs at levels inconsistent with the maximization of their j oint 
profits. Additional restrictions are required to attain equilibria 
that maximize the j oint profits of the manufacturer and its dealers .  
RPM is such a restriction . 5 RPM (minimum) is a sharing mechanism that
provides incentives for both the manufacturer and any one dealer to 
supply inputs yielding efficient equilibria (Kl ein and Murphy , 1 983) . 
The wel fare consequences of transaction costs applications of 
RPM are straightforward . RPM promotes productive efficiencies in the 
distribution process when there are horizontal external ities among 
dealers or vertical externalities between dealers and the 
manufacturer . RPM is a contractual form that mitigates or eliminates 
the agency problems of disintegrated distribution when simple price­
mediated exchange in the wholesale marke t resul ts in outcomes 
inconsistent with the maximization of the j oint profits of the 
manufacturer and the dealers . 6 
Empirical Studies of Resale Price Maintenance 
The industrial organiztion literature is r eplete with 
empirical studies of RPM. Cross-sectional studies of RPM typically 
employ one of two methodol ogies . First , the relationship be tween the 
use of RPM and the retail price of the product is examined 
( Overstreet , 1 983 ,  p. 1 06-117) . The motivation for conducting such 
studies is straightforward given a structural ist perspective . A 
reduction in the variation of prices to consumers is indicative of 
lessened competition and a high degree of price discipline among 
members of a cartel . Simil arly ,  "[i ] f, as has been suggested , resale 
price maintenance can be expected to make for less rather than more 
competition , it is reasonable to expect that its use woul d make for 
higher consumer prices" ( Bowman , 1 95 5 ,  p .  850) . In general , the 
variance of retail prices is smal ler and the level higher when 
distribution occurs in a R PM regime . 
The methodologies and conclusions of empirical price studies 
are criticized on many grounds ( Frankel , 1 95 5; and McLaughl in , 1 97 9) . 
For the current purpose it is sufficient to note that the impl ications 
of the structuralist and transaction costs theories with respect to 
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price variation and l evel are indistinguishable .  I f  uniform retail 
pricing is a necessary condition for the efficiency of disintegrated 
distribution, a reduction in the variation of retail prices resul ts . 
Moreover , if RPM is employed to induce distributors to provide 
services or quality inputs or signal product quality , a positive 
correlation between the use of RPM and product price is expected. The 
introduction of RPM creates a change in the composition of the product 
that increases its value to the consumer ( Bork , 1 97 8 ,  p. 2 96 ) , Thus , 
price studies cannot be relied upon to differentiate among the 
disparate hypotheses of RPM. 
A second type of empirical study analyzes the effect of RPM on 
the average size of retail outlets ( Weiss, 1 967 ) . Cartels with free 
entry result in excess capaci ty . A structuralist perspective argues 
that RPM reduces the average size of retail outlets still fur ther 
since the maintained retail price is higher than would otherwise 
prevail .  There is some evidence that the use of RPM is inversely 
related to the size of retail outlets . 
The structuralist and transaction costs theories have 
identical implications for the relati onship between RPM and the 
average siz e of retail outlets (Marvel and McCafferty, 1 984 ) . Mass 
distributors compete primarily on price and depend upon high volume to 
exploit economies associated with inventory and warehousing . These 
dealers are placed at a compe titive disadvantage upon the inception of 
RPM. Mass distributors must mimic the techniques of dealers who 
provide services or signal s to consumers or exit the marke t in the 
distribution of goods that are price maintained . Either of these 
adj ustments resul ts in a reduction in the average size of dealer 
outlets . If RPM is employed to mitigate the agency probl ems of 
disi ntegrated distribution, equilibria in the structure of the 
distribution industry are characterized by smaller retail outl ets . 
Thus , studies that examine the relationship between RPM and the 
average size of dealer outlets are incapable of discriminating among 
the theories of RPM. 7 
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Case study analyses are important sources of information about 
RPM. The motivations and effects of RPM are examined across a wide 
group of products and industries ( Overstree t ,  1 983 , p. 1 1 9-1 2 5 ) . 
These studies suggest that R PM is used both to promote cartel 
stabil ity and address agency problems in the distribution of branded 
products. The possi bility that RPM may deter efficiency in some cases 
while promoting it in others further limits the useful ness of extant 
cross-sectional studies.  The highly aggregated l evel of analysis in 
these studies does not permit the alternative theories of RPM to hold 
simul taneously .  An impl icit assumption of such studies i s  that RPM is 
used either to foster cartels or promote distributional efficiencies . 
These empirical designs bias at least one of the alternative 
hypotheses towards the null hypothesis .  Thus, inferences derived from 
existing cross-sectional empirical work are not only incapable of 
distinguishing among competing hypotheses, but they are biased as 
wel l .  
III . AN OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIR ICAL FRAMEWORK 
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The history of public policy towards RPM i s  quite rich . This 
policy clearly plays a role in a firm ' s  decision to employ RPM. The 
ambivalence and vicissitudes of this policy caused many firms t o  adopt 
RPM distribution practices that were subsequently subjected to 
antitrust challenge . 8 For exampl e ,  from the beginning of 1 96 0  through 
the end of 1 981 ,  the Federal Trade Commission ( FTC) and the Antitrust 
Division of the Justice Department (JD) filed mor e  than 110 complaints 
in effor ts to enjoin firms from employing R PM. The vast majority of 
these complaints resulted in the adoption of alternative cartel 
management or distribution techniques .  This section o f  the paper 
identifies the expected effects of these complaints on the profits of 
relevant firms conditioned on the al ternative theories of RPM. It 
also indentifies some necessary conditons of these theories and their 
relationship to the profit effects of the antitrust complaints . 
The Implications of Antitrust Enforcement 
Alternative mechanisms exist to sustain a dealers ' or 
manufacturers ' cartel or mitigate the agency problems of disintegrated 
distribution. These al ternatives are ,  however , l ess effective or more 
costly .  A manufacturer s '  or dealers ' cartel or a manufacturer by 
itsel f would not rationally choose RPM if a less costly cartel 
management or distribution mechanism exists. Consequently , antitrust 
complaints al ter the subsequent revenues or increase the costs of 
firms affected by RPM. The qualitative effect of the antitrust 
chal lenge on the future profits of the manufacturing firm named in the 
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complaint and its competi tors yields a n  estimate of the economic 
motivations for RPM .  The comparative statics effects of a n  antitrust 
challenge on these firm ' s  profits condi tioned on the alternative 
theories of RPM are developed below . 
Assume that the purpose of RPM is to foster a dealer s '  cartel . 
Then RPM has a non-positive effect on the manufacturer ' s  profits . If 
the manufacturer possesses monopoly power or employs Ricardian 
factors,  rent shifting to the distribution level occurs , The cartel 
obtains the monopoly profits from output restriction and the rents 
that would normally accrue to the manufacturer given a competitive 
distribution industry . If the manufacturer is in a competitive 
industry characterized by homogeneous technology and access to 
productive inputs ,  the effects of the cartel are nul l .  The 
manufacturer must earn at least a competitive rate of return in 
equil ibrium . RPM has an indeterminate effect on the manufacturer ' s  
rival s '  profits.  If the manufacturer ' s  competi tors are subject to the 
dealers ' cartel , its effect on their profits is also non-positive for 
the same reasons outlined above,  However , the manufacturer ' s  rivals 
can conceivabl y benefit from interbrand shifting if they are 
unencumbered by the dealers ' cartel ( Posner , 1 97 6 ,  p ,  1 4 8) . Thus, if 
RPM is facilitating g dealers ' cartel , the qualitative effect of an 
antitrust challenge on the future profits of the manufacturing firm 
named in the complaint is non-negative . The effect of the complaint 
on the manufacturer ' s  rivals ' future profits is indeterminat e .  
Assume , instead, that the purpose o f  RPM is to foster a 
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manufacturers ' cartel . Then RPM has a positive effect on the profits 
of the manufacturer . RPM also has a positive effect on the profits of 
the manufacturer ' s  competi tor s .  I f  the cartel contains all of the 
firms in the manufacturing industry, successful collusion results in 
output r estriction strategies that increase the profits to members of 
the cartel . If RPM facil itates a manufactur ers ' cartel containing 
only dominant firms , the dominant firm group benefits whil e fringe 
firms can free-ride on the subsequent price discipline . Even the 
marginal firm in the industry benefits from the cartel . Thus, if RPM 
is facilitating s manufacturers ' cartel, the qualitative effect of an 
antitrust challenge .QI! the future profits of the manufacturer named in 
the complaint is negative. The effect of the complaint on the 
manufacturer ' s  competitors ' future profits is also negative . 
Assume , now, that R PM is employed to mitigate or eliminate the 
agency problems of disintegrated distribution. RPM has a positive 
effect on the profits of the manufacturer . RPM r educes the 
manufacturer ' s  distribution costs .  RPM has a non-positive effect on 
the profits of the manufacturer ' s  competitor s .  It  cannot benefit the 
manufacturer ' s  compe titors for the manufacturer to employ a least cost 
method of product distribution. This holds r egardless of the 
distribution regimes employed by the manufacturer ' s  compe titors. 
Thus , if RPM reduces the agency costs of disintegrated distribution, 
the effect of an antitrust challenge on the future profits of the 
manufacturer named in the complaint is negative. The effect of the 
challenge .QI! the manufacturer ' s  competitors future profits is non-
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negative . 
Table 1 depicts the qualitative reactions of the manufacturing 
firm ' s  and its compe titors ' future profits to an antitrust complaint 
resul ti ng in the discontinuation of RPM given the al ternative 
theories . The economic effects of RPM in a particular case are 
uniquely determined by the configuration of these reactions . 
Necessary Conditions of the Alternative Hypotheses 
Whether RPM is used to foster a cartel or promote efficient 
product distribution depends on certain structural characteristics of 
the firm and industry . Some of these characteristics are identified 
below. Examining the relationships between these characteristics and 
the estimated effects of RPM for a cross-section of observations 
provides tests of the alternative theories . 
A necessary condition for the use of RPM to promote a dealers ' 
or manufactur ers ' cartel is some degree of intra-industry 
coordination. Dealers or producers at the distribution or 
manufacturing l evels must cooperate to establish and enforce rules 
that restrict output and generate monopoly rents.  In the 
structur alist tradition, seller-concentration is the most frequently 
used proxy of intra-industry cooperation ( Scherer , 1 98 0 ,  p, 267-96) , 
The probability of detecti ng firms that defect from the optimal cartel 
strategy is inversely related to the number of cartel members ( Bai n, 
1 951; and S tigl er ,  1 964) . Put simply,  the costs of maintaining 
collusive agreements are lower the fewer the participants.  If the 
structuralist theories of RPM are valid, measures of seller 
Hypothesis 
Dealer Cartel 
Manufacturer Cartel 
Transaction Costs 
TABLE 1 
EQUILIBRIUM RESPONSE TAXONOMY 
Qual itative change in future profits 
due to RPM antitrust complaint 
Manufacturer 's 
Manufacturer Competi tors 
{ 0) or {+) { -) .  ( 0) or {+) 
{ 0) or {-) ( -) 
( 0) or {-) ( 0 )  or { +) 
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concentration i n  the production and distribution industries should 
discriminate among the estimated effects. Mor eover , higher levels of 
concentration in the manufacturing and distributing sectors should 
correlate directly with observations where R PM is estimated to foster 
manufacturers ' and deal ers ' cartels ,  respectively,  
A necessary condition for transaction costs applications of 
RPM is the existence of agency costs in the distribution process . 
Assume that such costs exist . In both the case of horizontal 
externalities among deal ers and vertical external ities between a 
dealer and the manufacturer , these agency costs are an increasing 
function of the size of the manufacturing firm . 9 The relative costs 
of controlling a disintegrated distribution system are increasing in 
the size of the firm . A l arger manufacturer must interact with more 
dealers for a given efficient scale at the distribution l evel . Given 
a cross-section of firms from different industries , the size of a firm 
relative to i ts compe titors , the firm ' s  market share, reflects the 
differential costs of disintegrated distribution in the presence of 
agency probl ems . If the transaction costs theory is val i d ,  measures 
of the manufacturing firm ' s  market share shoul d discriminate among the 
estimated effects of R PM. Moreover , market share should correlate 
directly with observations where RPM is estimated to mitigate agency 
probl ems in the distribution process . 
IV . AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF RF.SALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 
This section of the paper conducts the empirical analysis 
developed above . This analysis consists of two stages , The first 
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stage makes use o f  publ ic and private antitrust enforcement efforts t o  
gain estimates o f  the economic effects o f  RPM. The second stage 
examines the relationship between these estimated effects of RPM and 
necessary conditions of the alternative theories . Jointl y ,  this 
procedure permits tests of the disparate theories of RPM. 
Measuring the Effects of Antitrust Enforcement 
In principle ,  changes in the recorded profits of a 
manufacturer and its competitors subsequent to an antitrust challenge 
can be used to assess the economic motivations of RPM. The problems 
of using accounting profits to measure economic profits are , however , 
legion (Lindenberg and Ross , 1 981 ; Fisher and McGowen, 1 9 83 ) , 
Moreover , the dynamic relationship be tween the adoption of a new 
cartel management or distribution technique and registered profits 
cannot ex ante be known. An al ternative method of measuring the 
change in economic profits subsequent to an antitrust challenge 
against RPM is warranted. 
The use of financial data to measure changes in the future 
profits of enterprises is a standard practice in the accounting and 
finance li teratures (Fama, Fisher ,  Jensen and Roll , 1 96 9 ) . This 
methodol ogy is increasingly prevalent in the empirical , industrial 
organization literature (Burns, 1 977 ; Eckbo, 1 983 ; and Chalk,  1 984 ) , 
If the abandonment of RPM in the distribution of products is largely 
unanticipated or the probabil ity of its termination is al tered by 
antitrust challenges, the "efficient marke ts, rational expectations" 
(Muth , 1 96 1 )  hypothesis implies that contemporaneous changes in 
security prices represent unbiased estimates of the expected changes 
in the future profits of firms affected by RPM. That i s ,  "an 
efficient capital market sets the prices of assets equal to the 
present value of the expected future cash flows , thus reflecting the 
total impact of regulatory change on shareholder weal th" ( Schwert , 
1 981 , p. 123-24) . 
The capital market effects of RPM antitrust challenges are 
examined below . 10 Several steps are required to conduct these
analyses.  First , the initial sample is drawn from antitrust 
complaints brought by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC ) , the 
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department (JD) , and private 
individual s and corporations against firms employing RPM .  The 
majority of these challenges are brought under Section I of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act or Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act ,  A small number of suits are brought under the Robinson-Patman 
Act. All of these compl aints chal lenge the practice of RPM. 
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Second , information contained in the compl aints themselves and 
firm-specific data gathered from alternate sources (Moody ' s  Industrial 
Manual and Standard and Poor ' s  Registry of Corporations) are used to 
assign a set of 4-digit SIC product codes to each case . If the 
product named in a complaint corresponds with an existing 4-digit SIC, 
such as tire manufacturing (3011 ) ,  a single code is assigned. If no 
single 4-digit SIC sufficiently encompasses the products distributed 
under R PM and named in the complaint , such as women ' s  dresses,  
lingerie and spor tswear (23 3 5 , 23 3 9 , 23 41 ) ,  or  close substitutes are 
avail abl e ,  such as fine china dinnerware (326 2 , 3263)  and china and 
glassware (3229) , mul tiple codes are assigned. These codes are used 
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t o  identify a set of potential competi tors for the manufacturing firm. 
Firms in this set that are also listed on the CRSP daily stock return 
tape are the competitors used in the analyses. 
Third, Wall Street Journal announcements of the disposition of 
the antitrust compl aints represent changes in the information 
available to marke t participants. The assumption that changes in 
information coincide with these announcements is frequently employed 
in the literature (Eckbo, 1 983 ; Dodd and Warner, 1 983 ; and S tillman, 
1 983 ) . These announcements reflect changes in investors ' assessments 
of the future profits of firms affected by the marketing practice of 
RPM. Consequently ,  antitrust complaints unreported by the Wall Street 
Journal are excluded from the sample. 
Fourth , stock return models for the manufacturing firm named 
in the antitrust challenge and a portfolio of its competitors are 
estimated for each case. The purpose of these estimations is t o  
measure changes in capital market participants ' assessments o f  the 
future profits of these firms resulting from the antitrust complaint. 
These models must control for other changes unrelated to the antitrust 
challenge. The market model (Fama, 1 976 ) , a standard model of the 
stock return generating process, is used for this purpose . This model 
relates the return to any individual security or portfolio of 
securities to the return on a portfolio consisting of all traded 
securities. This later portfolio is often referred to as the marke t 
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portfolio. The market model is also consistent with the return 
generating process implied by a portfolio-theoretic approach such as 
the Capital Asse t Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1 963 ) .  The fol lowing system , 
containing two modified market models ,  is estimated for each antitrust 
complaint using Zellner ' s  ( 1 96 2 )  Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model 
( SURM): 
where 
t = 1 ,  • • •  , 260 
t = 1 ,  • • •  , 26 0  
stock return o f  the manufacturing firm named i n  the 
complaint over week t ,  
R = stock return o f  a n  equally weighted portfolio of thect 
manufacturing firm ' s  competi tors over week t ,  
( 1 )  
R = stock return o f  the value-weighted market portfolio over mt 
week t ,  
a dummy variable eq ual t o  zero prior t o  the i th bit of 
information pertaining to the antitrust complaint and one 
thereafter , i=l , • • •  , k, 
NEG t a dummy variable equal to on
e if the ith bit of 
information decreases the probability of employing RPM 
and occurs in week t and zero otherwise , and 
a dummy variable equal to one if the i th bit of 
information increases the probability of employing RPM 
and occurs in week t and zero otherwise , and 
µft'µct = the disturbance terms over week t.
20 
The specification of system ( 1 )  minimizes the potential 
influence of various data problems in several ways . 1 1  System ( 1 )  also
provides estimates of changes in the future profits of the upstream 
firm named in the antitrust complaint and its competitor s .  The dummy 
variabl es NEGt and POSt are eq ual to one in week t if information
decreasing or increasing, respectively, the probabil ity of employing 
RPM occurs in week t and zero otherwise . Examples of information that 
decrease this probabil ity are public allegations that a firm is 
violating a statute by employing RPM, rulings by an FTC examiner that 
the marketi ng practices of a firm are illegal , or consent decrees 
prohibiting a firm from utiliz ing RPM. Examples of information that 
increase this probabil ity are terminations of current antitrust suits 
which do not alter the marketing practices of the firm or court 
actions that retire or lift existing antitrust agency prohibitions 
agai nst R PM .  The estimates rfl ' rf2' Ycl ' and rc2 represent
unexpected or abnormal changes in the stock returns of the 
manufacturer and its competitors due to the antitrust challenge . 
Given the efficient marke ts, rational expectations hypothesis ,  these 
estimates are unbiased measures of the changes in the capital ized 
profits of these firms due to the antitrust action. 
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The initial sample of RPM antitrust cases is drawn from 
complaints brought by the FTC , JD , and private individuals and 
corporations . The use of Wall Street Journal announcements concerning 
the disposition of antitrust complaints reduces the sample 
considerably. The use of the CRSP tape to obtain daily stock return 
data limits the period from which the sample may be drawn to July , 
1 96 2  until the present . The final sample contains 45 antitrust 
complaints;  19 initiated by the FTC , 1 9  by the JD , and 7 by private 
concerns and individual s .  Table A. 1 lists the complaints used i n  the 
current study . Appendix A also provides an example of the application 
of the empirical framework to one observation in the sampl e .  
The Significance of RPM Antitrust Enforcement 
The formulation developed above permits an analysis of the 
significance of an antitrust challenge for the capitalized value of 
firms.  This analysis is informative for two reasons . First , it 
reflects on the importance of the practice of RPM. The avail ability 
of close substi tutes,  such as non-price verti cal restrictions , 
diminishes the capital marke t effects of RPM antitrust enforcement . 
�econd, this analysis reflects on the assumptions used in the 
empirical formulation. Failures of one or more of these assumptions 
reduce the signi ficance of the abnormal performance estimates . 
Table 2 provides information on the statisti cal significance 
of the 45 capital market studies conducted in this paper . The first 
TABLE 2 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CAPITAL MARKET RESPONSE 
TO RPM ANTITRUST COMPLAINTS 
Cross-sectional distribution of SURM R-square and �i ' i = l ,  .. . , 4S 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Fractiles of the 
sample distribution 
.10 
. 2S 
.so 
. 7S 
. 90 
Maximum 
Minimum 
SURM System 
R-Square 
. 3 6 6 80 
. 1 3 6 89 
. 1 81 4 8  
.2S3 9S 
.3S670 
.47 21S 
• S7 97 4 
.610SO 
.12S70 
*Significant at the .OS percent level.
Variables 
.44102 
.2943 9 
.03360 
.21880 
. 36160 
.63 96S 
. 8 81 80 
.998SO 
.00160 
l lS. 93 7* 
column of Table 2 presents statistics on the cross-secti onal 
distribu tion of the weighted SURM R-squares , The SURM R-squares for 
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the studies range from , 1 26 to . 661 and have a mean of . 3 67 and median 
of . 3S7. The standard deviation of the SURM R-squares for the sample 
is . 13 7. The second column of Table 2 presents statistics on the 
cross-sectional distribution of the probability level s associated with 
the test of the null hypothesis that all of the abnormal return 
parameters of system ( 1 )  are equal to zero. 12 These probability
level s ,  denoted �i' i=l , 2 , ,  • .  , 4S ,  represent the probabil ity of 
rejecting the null hypothesis that rf1=rf2=rc1=rc2=0 in any one 
capital market analysis when in fact it is true. This is a test of 
the significance of the antitrust complaint for the futur e profits of 
firms affected by RPM. The �i for the 4S event studies r anges from
.001 6  (the most significant ) to . 99 8S (the least significant ) and have 
a mean of . 4410 and a median of . 3 61 6. For hal f the sample the null 
hypothesis can be rejected at a . 3 616 level of certainty. For 2S'J> of 
the sampl e ,  the nul l hypothesis can be rej ected with a . 21 8 8  degree of 
certainty. 
The second column of Table 2 indicates that the measured 
effects of the antitrust challenges vary widely across cases in the 
sample ,  A test of the hypothesis that,  o n  average , this r eaction i s  
not significantly different from zero is conducted. That is , can the 
explana tion of the time series of rates of return to firms involved in 
RPM antitrust cases be enhanced by considering information pertaining 
to the disposition of the antitrust challenge? Since �i ' i=1 , , , , , 4S , 
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is distributed uniformly on the uni t interval under the null 
hypothesis ,  -2log(�i) is distributed as a chi-square with 2 degrees of 
freedom. Since the estimation periods in the individual event studies 
are different , the �i are independent and -2�1:11og(�i) is
distributed x2 ( 90 )  (Maddal a ,  1 977 , p, 47-48 ) . As can be seen in the
last row of Tabl e 2 ,  rejection of the null hypotheses at a high l evel 
of significance is possibl e .  On average , information about the 
disposition of RPM antitrust challenges affects the future profits of 
firms . This resul t reflects positively on the importance of RPM for 
these firms and the validity of the assumptions employed in the 
empirical framework .  
Assessing the Effects of RPM 
The empirical formulation also yields measures of the economic 
effects of RPM for each case . 13  These measures are obtained by 
evaluating the qual itative configuration of the abnormal return 
estimates of system ( 1 )  according to the comparative static 
predictions summarized in Table 1 .  Posterior probabil ities that the 
alternative motivations of RPM underlie these estimates are calculated 
for each case . These calculations are used to summarize the capital 
marke t analyses and conduct hypothesis tests of RPM. 
Bayes Theorem is used to obtain estimates of the effects of 
RPM for each observation in the sample .  Recall that there are three 
potential motivations for employing RPM. Let mi , i=l , 2 , 3 , index these
rationales.  Recal l ,  too, that the r = < rfl ' rf2.r01 , rc2> of system ( 1 )
summarize information rel evant for assessing the effects of RPM 
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antitrust complaints on the future profits of firms.  Fol lowing Bayes'  
Theorem , the posterior probabil ity of mi given r is equal to the
likelihood of the r given mi times the prior probabil ity of mi divided
by the likelihood of the r given mj times the prior probability of mj 
summed over all mj , j=l , 2 , 3 . That i s ,
p (mi
lr >  = A (ylmi ) p (mi)/��=lA (rlmj ) p (mj ) where p (• )  represents a 
probability density function and A(•I• >  is a likelihood function. The 
posterior probabil ity of the mi , i=l , 2 , 3 , conditional on r can 
be 
calculated for each case given a l ikelihood function and prior 
probabilities, The likelihood function A (ylmi) ,  i=l , 2 , 3 ,  is well­
defined under the assumption that the elements of r are independent 
AA A A 
and N (y , a  ) where r are the estimates and a the standard error of the r r 
estimates of system ( 1 ) . 
Posterior probabil ities of the al ternative theories of RPM 
A 
given the r are calculated for each of the 4 5  observations in the 
sample assuming equal prior s .  Appendix A provides a n  example o f  the 
A 
cal culation of p (mi
lr > . i=l , 2 , 3 ,  for one of the observations in the
·Sampl e .  Table 3 reports the cross-sectional distributions of these
probabilities . The first column of this table presents some 
A 
statistics of the cross-sectional probability that the r of system ( 1 )  
are generated i n  regimes where RPM fosters a deal ers ' cartel . The 
range for this probability is .0072 to . 997 4 .  The mean probability 
that R PM facilitates a dealers ' cartel across the 4 5  observations in 
the sample is . 2764 while the median is . 1 40 5 .  The second column of 
Tabl e 3 presents some statistics of the cross-sectional probability 
TABLE 3 
POSTERIOR PROBABILITIES OF THE ALTERNATIVE THEORIES 
ACCORDING TO THE CAPITAL MARKET RESPONSES• 
Cross-sectional distributions of the probabil ities of 
the alternative theories of RPM 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Fractiles of 
the sample 
distribution 
.10 
. 2 5  
• 50 
• 7 5
. 90 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Probabil ity 
of 
Dealer 
Cartel 
. 27638 
. 2 8220 
.02273 
• 06283
. 1 40 4 8  
.4711 8 
. 7796 9  
• 99742 
. 007 1 8  
Variables 
Probabil ity 
of 
Manuf acturer 
Cartel 
. 3 3 87 9  
. 26 148 
. 0040 9  
.092 52 
. 3 20 3 8  
. 52440 
. 7 3 240 
• 88310 
.00040 
•Prior probabilities are assumed equal.
Probability 
of 
Transaction Cost 
Application 
. 3 8483 
. 2 83 52 
• 0 543 0 
. 1 3113 
. 3 6036 
• 5 8547
. 84710 
. 94910 
. 00019 
2 5  
,. 
that the r of system ( 1 ) are generated in regimes where R PM fosters a 
manufacturers ' cartel . The range for this probability is . 0004 to 
, 8831 .  The mean probability that R PM facil itates a manufacturer s '  
cartel across the 4 5  observations i n  the sample i s  , 3 3 88 while the 
median is . 3 20 4 .  Finally , the third column of Table 3 presents some 
,.. 
statistics of the cross-sectional probability that the r of system ( 1 )  
are generated i n  regimes where R PM i s  used t o  achieve efficiencies in 
product distribution. The range for this probability is . 0002 to 
. 94 91 . The mean probability that R PM facilitates efficient product 
distribution across the 45 observations in the sampl e is . 3 84 8  whil e 
the median is . 3 603 . In general , the resul ts of Table 3 s uggest 
either that the effects of RPM in the current sample are approximately 
uniformly distributed across the three theoretic rational es or that 
inferences based on the capital market analyses of antitrust 
complaints are meaningl ess. The validity of these competing 
interpretations are analyzed below • 
Hypothesis Tests of RPM Theories 
The capital market analysis through Bayes Theorem yield a 
joint posterior probabil ity structure over the theor eti c rational es 
for RPM. An analysis of the relationship between the necessary 
conditions of the al ternative theories and this joint posterior 
probabil ity structure permits hypothesis tests of the theories . Such 
an analysis also reflects on the validity of drawing inferences about 
the effects of RPM from the capital analyse s .  
Three variables are used to estimate differences in these 
posterior probabilities across observations in the sampl e .  These 
variables are the four-firm measures of industrial concentration at 
the distribution and manufacturing stage and the market share of the 
upstream firm named in the antitrust complaint . These data are 
obtained from a variety of sources. Concentration measures for the 
distribution industry ( DC )  are taken from the 1 97 7  Census of 
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Retailers. This is the first year for which concentration measures in 
the retailing sector are reported. 1 4  Concentration measures for the
manufacturing industry (MC)  are taken from the Census of Manufacturers 
for the publication year nearest the actual date of the antitrust 
complai nt . The market share of the upstream firm ( SH )  is created by 
dividing the upstream firm ' s  sales of price maintained products by the 
value of shipments in that industry . The firm ' s  sales of price 
maintained products are estimated by using information in the 
antitrust complaint and firm-specific data contained in Moody ' s  
Industrial Manual . The value of shipments is contained in the Survey 
of Manufacturers. Both the firm ' s  sales and the value of shipments 
are from the year in which the antitrust complaint is actually 
initiated. Tabl e 4 presents some summary statistics of the cross-
sectional distribution of these variables for the current sample. 
System ( 2) is estimated to assess the relationship between the 
joint posterior probability structure obtained through the capital 
market analyses and DC, MC, and SH: 
TABLE 4 
SUMMARY STATISTICS• 
Cross-sectional distri butions of variables used 
in system ( 2 )  
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Fractiles of the 
Sample Distribution 
.10 
.25 
.so 
• 7 5
. 90 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Dealer 
Concentration 
9.66 
6.11 
3. 5 
5. 1 
9.1 
1 4. 4  
17.6 
26.2 
1.4 
Vari ables 
Manufacturer 
Concentration 
43. 57
1 9.07 
22.2 
2 8.0 
3 8.0 
5 8.5 
6 9.4 
91.0 
1 8.0 
•Two observations ( Beechcraft and Piper ) are anitted. 
Market 
Share 
1 2.98 
12 . 90 
0.60 
3.35 
10.94 
1 5.40 
3 4.20 
53.90 
0.20 
log ( pj1/pj3 ) 610 + 61 1log ( DCj ) + 61 2log (MCj ) + 613 log ( SHj ) 
+ Bl j' j = 1 ,  . • .  , n  
log ( pj2/pj 3 ) 620 + 621 log ( DCj ) + 622log (MCj ) + 623 log ( SHj ) 
+ B2j' j = 1 ,  • • •  , n  
where 
the posterior probability that the j th observation is 
consistent with the dealers ' cartel hypothesis ,  
the posterior probability that the j th observation is 
consistent with the manufacturers ' cartel hypothesis,  
the posterior probability that the j th observation is 
consistent with the transaction costs hypothesis ,  
DC j = the 4-firm concentration ratio a t  the distribution stage
for the j th observation, 
the 4-firm concentr ation ratio at the manufacturing 
stage for the j th observation, 
the market share of the upstream firm for the jth 
observation, and 
e1j , e2 j  = the disturbance terms over observation j ,
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( 2 )  
This model posits a linear relationship between the l og of the 
ratios of the posterior probability estimates and the log of the 
hypothesized explanatory variables . Ordinarily ,  the probabil ity 
distributions must be estimated from actual frequencies. Least-
squares estimation results in heteroscedasticity of the error terms. 
In the current applicati on, however , the capital market analyses 
through Bayes Theorem yield direct estimates of the posterior 
2 8  
probabil ities that a given R PM motivation, mi, i=l , 2 , 3 ,  underlies the
,. 
y. The ratios of these estimates serve as the dependent variables in 
the multivariate probit system . The logarithmic transformation of the 
odds ratios scales the dependent variables from ( -m,m) , Thus , 
problems of heteroscedastici ty normally associated with probit 
analyses are not present in system ( 2 ) . 
A different source of heteroscedasticity is possible in system 
( 2) , however . The estimates of pji ' i=l , 2 , 3 ,  used in system ( 2) are
derived from time-series regression equations that vary substantially 
in their expl anatory power across observations in the sample .  In 
A 
particul ar , the precision of the y for the individual capital market 
analyses is widely distributed . Heteroscedasticity of the error terms 
,. 
of system ( 2 )  according to the precision of the y is thus a 
consideration. The probabil ity level associated with the null 
hypothesis that all of the abnormal return estimates of system ( 1 ) are 
,. 
equal to zero quantifies the precision of the y. The lower the 
probability level , the lower the expected variance of the error for a 
given observation in the sample .  These variance-of-error proxies are 
incorporated in system ( 2) by weighting each observation by the 
inverse of the probability level associated with the hypotheses that 
" 
r = 0 ,  This procedure yields a weighted least-squares regression 
analysis where the weights are 1
/
� j' j = 1 ,  • •  , n. 
The capital market analyses yield estimates of the 
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probabil ities that each o f  the alternative theories of RPM underlies 
the � of the system ( 1 ) , Since 
L:i=l pi = 1 for all j = 1 ,  • • •  , n, only 
two of these probabil ity estimates are independent. For instance , 
errors in the estimation of p1 are correlated with errors in the
estimation p2 or p3 in system ( 2) .  Thus , system ( 2) is estimated
usually Zellner ' s  Seeming Unrelated Regression Model ( SURM) .  This 
technique is employed to account for the correl ation between 
s1j and s2 j' j = 1 ,  • • •  , n. The properties of this technique are 
dev eloped above. 
The logarithmic transformation of the HHS variabl es in system 
( 2) mitigates potential non-lineari ties in the relationship between 
the odds ratios and these variables, It also facil itates cal culation 
of the ( mean) relationships between the HHS variables and the 
individual pi' i=1 , 2 , 3. Recall that the log ( p1/P 3 > and log ( p2/p3 ) are
equal to logp1-logp3 and logp2-logp3 , respectiv ely, and 
L:�=1pi = 1 
for each observ ation j ,  j = 1 ,  • • •  , n. The deriv ative of the two 
equations in system ( 2 )  and the probability constraint with respect to 
the log of a giv en HHS variable yields a set of three equations with 
three unknowns. The unknowns in the set of three equations are the 
elasti cities of the posterior probabilities with respect to a giv en 
HHS variable. By solving this set of equations , estimates for the 
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percentage change in a pi ' i=l , 2 , 3 ,  resulting from a percent change in
1 5a given HHS variable can be obtained. 
A weighted SURM estimation of system ( 2 )  is conducted using 43 
observations in the sample. Two observations ( Beechcraft and Piper ) 
are deleted since data on DC cannot be obtai ned. Table 5 contains the 
estimation results. Table 5 also contains the elasticity calculations 
(alogpi) / ( alogxm) and significance tests where p1 , p2 , and p3 are the
posterior probabil ities that RPM is facil itating a dealer ' s  cartel , a 
manufacturers '  cartel , or efficiencies in the distribution process , 
respectively. The xm represents the HHS variables. 
The overall ex pl anatory power of system ( 2 ) is good. A test 
of the null hypothesis that the j oint probability structure is 
unaffected by all of the explanatory variables yields an F ( 6, 7 8) of 
1 4. 3 3 8. This value is significant at the 1% level. Moreover , tests 
of the hypotheses that the joint probabil ity structure is unaffected 
by the individual independent variables , reported in the last column 
of Table 5 ,  can be rejected at the 1% level in all three cases. 
Concentration measures at the distri bution and manufacturing stages 
and the market share of the manufacturing firm are relevant for 
explaining the posterior probabilities of the effects of RPM dev eloped 
through the capital market studies. 
The effects of the explanatory variables on the joint 
probability structure are consistent with all of the theories of RPM. 
The value of (alogp1 ) /CalogDC ) is 4.249. Higher levels of 
concentration in the distribution industry increase the probability 
Independent 
Variables 
log (DC ) 
log(MC) 
log (SH ) 
constant 
TABLE 5 
ESTIMATION OF SYSTEM (2) AND CALCULATION 
OF MEAN VALUES FOR Calogpi ) / (alogxm) 
Parameter Estimates Elasticity Calculations 
ca1ogpi> / Ca1ogxm> 
log (p1f P3 ) log C p2/ p3 ) logp1 logp2 logp3 
8 . 853  6 , 366 4 . 249 1 . 763  - 4 . 604 
-6. 2 86 -2 . 36 8  -3. 7 47 0. 172 2 . 540 
-0. 7 3 8  -1. 7 96 0 . 07 4  -0 . 984 0. 813
7. 948 -2. 867 
F (2 , 7 8) 
26. 7 1 9
5 . 903 
8. 162
aThe F-statistic values reported are for the null hypothesis that the j oint
probability structure is unaffected by the variable . All of the F­
statistic values are significant at the 1 percent level . The F-statistic 
value for the system is 14.3 3 8  which is also significant at the 1 percent 
l evel . 
that R PM facilitates a dealers' cartel . The value for 
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Calogp2 > / CalogMC ) is 0 . 1 7 2 .  Higher levels of concentration in the
manufacturing industry increase the probability that RPM f acilitates a 
manufacturers ' cartel . The value of (alogp3) /(alogSH) is 0 , 81 3 . 
Firms with larger market shares are more likely to use RPM to reduce 
their distribution costs. All three results are consistent with the 
predicted effects of RPM under the alternative hypotheses .  Since 
these estimates are elastici ties, the quantitative effects of the 
independent variables on the position probabil ities may be evaluated 
in the usual manner . 
The elasticity calculations presented in Table 5 bear on 
several other aspects of the relationship between manufacturers and 
distributor s .  The inverse relationship between transaction costs 
applications of RPM and dealer concentration (alogp3 ) / (alogDC) can be
indicative of the costs of disintegrated distribution. Concentrated 
distribution industries may be amenable to less formal , and less 
costl y ,  forms of verti cal control than RPM. The positive relationship 
between transaction costs uses of RPM and manufacturer concentration 
(alogp3 ) /(alogMC ) is consistent with the view that a "manufacturer
must possess some monopoly power in order to induce low-cost and 
efficient retailers of the product to sell at the higher maintained 
price , sheltering higher cost retailers" (Porter 1 97 6 ,  p. 6 5 ) . Both 
(alogp1 > /CalogMC ) and (alogp2) /CalogDC ) should be negative under a 
bilateral theory of the relati onship between manufacturers and 
distributor s .  That i s ,  concentration a t  the manufacturing or 
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distributing stage r educes the probabil i ty that RPM is employed t o  
sustai n a deal ers ' or manufacturers ' cartel , respectively. While 
(ologp1 ) /(ologMC) is negative as predicted, (ologp2 > / CologDC ) is
posi tive.  Thus , the evidence is not clearly consistent with this 
theory. The relati onships between deal ers ' and manufacturers '  cartel 
applications of RPM and market share are ,  respectively,  positive and 
negative. Larger manufacturing firms are more likely to be the obj ect 
of a dealers ' cartel and less likely to be involved with a 
manufacturer cartel . The theor etical rationales for these results are 
not immediately obvious . Clearly,  much remains unknown about the 
relationship between manufacturers and dealers and its dependence on 
the structural and transactional characteristics of industries . 
V. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The analysis conducted in this paper possesses several 
implications. To begin,  it indicates that a singl e view of the 
motivations and effects of RPM is inconsistent with the data . The 
calculations derived from the capital marke t analyses indicate that 
there are three distinct rationales for using R PM. The posterior 
probabil ities assuming equal priors that RPM is employed for a given 
purpose correl ates , at a statistically significant level , with 
variables suggested by the deal ers ' and manufacturers ' cartel and 
transaction costs hypotheses.  Higher levels of concentration in the 
distribution and manufacturing industries , proxies for the degree of 
intra-industry coordination, correlate directly with higher 
probabilities that RPM is facil itating a deal ers ' and manufacturers ' 
cartel , respectively . Greater market shares, an indication of 
increased agency costs ,  correlate directly with the probability that 
RPM is employed to reduce the costs of disintegrated distribution. 
This evidence indicates that RPM is used for a wide variety of 
reasons. It also suggests a set of variables that coUld hel p 
disti nguish among the effects of RPM in different cases .  
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This finding has implications for contemporary antitrust 
pol icy . Some scholars of antitrust law argue that RPM be held legal 
� se (Bork, 1 97 8 ;  and Posner , 1 981 ) .  A former practitioner of 
antitrust pol icy favors adj udication of complaints agai nst RPM under a 
structured rule of reason criterion (Baxter , 1 982 ) .  Many favor the 
continued � se illegality of the practice (Pertschuk and Correia, 
1 983 ) .  The empirical results presented above are incongruous with 
either a�� legal or illegal antitrust approach towards RPM. RPM 
is found both to foster cartels and enhance the efficiency of product 
distribution. Moreover , the structural characteristics of the 
manufacturing and distributing industries are fundamentally related to 
the motivations and economic effects of this vertical restriction. 
These results question the current� se illegal doctrine applied to 
R PM and suggest that an appropriate rule of reason criterion can be 
forged. 
The analysis conducted above also yields additional inferences 
about RPM. For instance , the probabil ity of observing RPM used to 
mitigate the agency problems of disintegrated distribution is 
inversely related to concentration among dealers and directly related 
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t o  manufacturer concentration. The former result is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the bargaining costs associated with any 
generalized j oint production problem are smaller the fewer the 
players .  The later result i s  consistent with the view that i t  is 
sometimes in the interest of a monopolistic manufacturer to preserve 
differentially efficient dealers . The probability of observing RPM 
used to facil itate a dealer s '  cartel is inversely related to 
concentration at the manufacturing stage . This relationship is 
consistent with a bilateral theory of the relationship between 
manufacturers and dealers. Additional inferences about the use of RPM 
and the relationship between manufacturers and dealers can be gained 
by including pertinent variables in estimations of system ( 2) . 
And final l y ,  capital market studies are frequently used to 
analyze the economic effects of regulation and propositions in 
industrial organization. By examining the effects of regul atory 
induced wealth transfers , tests of theories are made possi ble .  This 
methodology has come under increasing scrutiny . Often, extraneous 
information may confound interpretations of the qualitative response 
of an asse t  to regulatory perturbations ( Halpern, 1 983 ) , Assessing 
the average effect on asset prices may cloak much of the relevant 
information. The inability to identify precisely the moment new 
information is impounded in security prices may drastically reduce the 
power of the associated tests ( Binder,  1 985 ) . The methodol ogy 
employed in this paper estimates the distribution of regulatory ( RPM 
anti trust compl ai nts) induced wealth effects inferred from the capital 
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market studies as a function of variables suggested by the disparate 
theories . A test of the joint hypothesis that inferences drawn from 
the capital market studies are not valid and the alternative theories 
of RPM have little predictive power is thus conducted. The 
proposition that the capital marke t analyses are of little value in 
analyzing the economic effects in question is refutabl e .  Indeed, in 
the current analysis refutation is warranted . Inferences based on 
analyses of the estimated distribution of motivations and effects of 
RPM are valid.  This approach has broader applications for the 
analysis of other forms of vertical control and, in general , 
propositions in industrial organization. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper conducts test s of the alternative theories of RPM. 
These tests are accompl ished by relating estimates of the economic 
effects of RPM for a cross-section of observations to necessary 
conditions of the alternative theories . Estimates of the effects of 
RPM are gained by observing the impact of antitrust complaints on the 
capitalized profits of relevant firms.  It  is shown above that the 
results of this analysis possess impor tant implications for the theory 
of vertical control , publ ic policy towards RPM, the strategic 
relationship between manufacturers and dealers in the distribution 
process, and the use of financial data and methodologies in analyzing 
industrial organization proposi tions. 
Perhaps the single most impor tant result contained in this 
paper is that positive support is found for each of the theories of 
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RPM. The data are consistent with the manufacturer cartel , dealer 
cartel , and transaction costs theories of RPM. This result is 
consistent with and indeed reiterates cal l s  for a rul e-of-reason 
antitrust approach towards R PM.  This resul t is also consistent with 
the increasing body of case study evidence that indicates that RPM may 
be used for different reasons under varying circumstances.  More 
importantly,  this result indicates the importance of both the 
structuralist and transaction costs models for understanding phenomena 
in industrial organization. 
FOOTNOTES 
• The comments of John Binder , Andrew Chal k ,  Thomas Overstreet,
Frederick Warren-Boulton, and seminar participants at the 
Economic Policy Office of the Justice Department , the Federal
Trade Commission, University of Southern Californi a ,  and 
Washington University are greatly appreciated . My dissertation
commit tee, Barry Weingast ,  William Marshal l ,  and Lee Benh am ,  is
largely responsible for any positive contributions contained in
this paper. I bear sole responsibility for the rest . 
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1 .  See Scherer ( 1 980 ) p .  3-6 , for a discussion of the structuralist 
paradigm . 
2 .  See Schwartz and Eisenstadt ( 1982 ) p .  43 , for a discussion of how 
RPM facil itates a manufacturers ' cartel . 
3 .  See Coase ( 1 93 7 ) , Alchian and Demsetz ( 1972) , and Will iamson 
( 1 97 5 )  for a discussion of the transaction costs paradigm . 
4 .  A simple model illustrates this poi nt . Let p ( y, a , a )  represent 
the retail price of a product where y is quantity , 
a =  C a1 , • •  , ai , • •  , an) e S � :m 
n a vector representing the
activities undertaken by the n deal ers to enhance the value of 
the product , and a , a0 � a < w, manufacturer actions that enhance 
demand for y .  Let y1 represent the quantity of the
manufacturer ' s  product distributed by the 1th dealer and v ( y1 , a1) 
its cost s .  The 1 th dealer ' s  profits are then 
ni = [p ( y ,
a , a ) - wl yi - v ( yi , ai) where w is the wholesale price
• 
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of the product . Let yi ( ai) be a maximizing choice of yi for each 
value of ai . Then, using the envelope theorem , Nash equilibrium
• 
among dealers necessitates ani/a
a
i = PaYi - va = O ,  V ieN , where
Pa > 0 and va > 0 are partial derivatives . A necessary condition
for equilibria that maximize the joint profits of the dealers 
( Pareto optimal ) is a c[�=1ni ) /a
ai = PaL�=1y� - Va 0, v i eN .
Thus Nash equil ibria are Pareto optimal iff pa = O ,  V i eN or 
\ n  • • 
l... i=lyi Yi ' their is only one dealer . 
R PM is represented by a constraint on dealer behavior 
\ n  • such that A - p ( y• , a, a )  = 0 where y• = l... i=lyi and A is the
maintained retail price , Nash equilibria under the RPM 
• 
constraint necessitate pa( yi + Ai ) - va = 0 ,  V isN where Ai is 
the Lagrangian multiplier . Equating this condition with that 
required for Pareto optimality yields 
• • Pa ( y  - Yi - Ai ) = 0 ,  V ieN . Since Ai is a positive monotonic
function of A, there exist a A such that Nash equilibria of a 
distribution system with RPM are Pareto optimal . 
5 .  Let w ( p )  now represent the wholesale price of a product as a 
function of the retail price . The ith dealer ' s  profits are given 
above in footnote 4 .  The manufacturer ' s  profits are 
• • nm = w ( p ) y  - c ( y  , a ) , Nash equilibria without RPM entails
• Pa( l  - wp) yi - va = 0 ,  V ieN,  where wp is the partial
derivative.  Pareto optimal ity implies fJ ( ni + nm) /a
a
i = wppay• + 
• 
pa( 1  - wp ) yi - va 
0 ,  V i eN .  Nash equilibria are Pareto
3 9 
optimal iff pa = 0 or wp = O • Pa > 0 by assumption.
impl ies a = a0 • Thus for a > a0 , Nash equilibria are not Pareto
optimal • 
Nash eq uil bria of the R PM model necessitates 
• pa[ ( 1  - wp) yi + Ai ] - va = 0 ,  V isN • Equating this condition
with that required for Pareto optimality requires 
• 
pa( wpy - Ai ) = O ,  V i sN • Agai n, since Ai is a positive
monotonic function of A, there exists a A where Nash eq uilibrium 
are Pareto optimal and a > a 0 • 
6 .  The success of RPM in overcoming the problems of moral hazard in 
distribution lies in its role as a non-balanced sharing mechanism 
( Holmstrom , 1 982 ; and Kambhu, 1982 ) .  It achieves this by 
creating discontinuities in the profit functions of the deal ers . 
The feasibil ity of thi s  sharing rule can be inval idated by 
binding endowment constraints. The existence of vertical 
restrictions that are often observed in conjunction with RPM, 
such as territorial constrai nts, may be understood as property 
rights that are valuable to dealers and forfeited in equilibria 
where the marke t price does not attain the maintained r etail 
price , Compl imentary verti cal restrictions , in this context , 
serve a bondi ng function. Other regularities of the distri bution 
process, such as franchise fees , may also serve this function. 
7 .  Recall that i n  the case of horizontal external ities among 
dealers, the coincidence of Nash and Pareto optimal equilibria 
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• without RPM necessitates pu[ y• - yi] = 0 ,  V i sN .  Thus , one way 
to mollify the externality problem when R PM is prohibited is to 
increase the propor tion of the manufacturer ' s  product distributed 
by any one deal er . The externality problem is l ess severe when 
• the differences between y• and yi are smal l .  Large retail 
outlets can address,  though not sol ve ,  free-rider problems in 
distribution. Thus , the correlation between the size of retail 
outlets and the use { or absence ) of RPM is perfectly explicable 
in a transaction costs framework. 
8 .  See Gilligan ( 1 984 ) , p, 1 1 5-140 for a discussion of historical 
and contemporary public policy towards R PM .  See , al so, Areeda 
( 1 983 ) p .  1 9-22 . 
• 9 .  Recall that p [y• - yi] = 0 ,  V i sN and w p y• = 0 are necessary u p u 
for the coincidence of Nash and Pareto optimal equilibria in the 
distribution models without RPM developed abov e .  When agency 
costs are present , i . e . , strict equality does not obtain, the 
divergence of these equilibria are positive functions of y • ,  the 
size of the manufacturing firm .  
1 0 .  The use of financial data t o  approximate the profit consequences 
of the antitrust complaints is not without difficul ties. Several 
biases can occur . For instance , potential l egal liabilities or 
penalties can bias downward the profit effects of the 
manufacturer named in the antitrust complaint.  Additional ly ,  the 
manufacturer ' s  competi tors may also be using R PM. In this case , 
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information about future antitrust activities contained in the 
current antitrust complaint can bias downward the estimate of the 
compe titors profits { Halpern, 1 983 ) , Moreover, the existence of 
arrangements beyond R PM between the manufacturers and the dealers 
is unknown. The existence of such structures { side payments )  can 
lead to unknown biases . By relating the estimated effects of RPM 
drawn from the capital market analyses of antitrust complaints to 
necessary conditions of alternative theories, howeve r ,  an 
indication of the extent of bias in the sample is yielded ,  That 
is,  correlation between the necessary conditions and estimated 
effects of RPM reflects favorably not only on the al ternative 
theories , but also on the absence of bias in the capital marke t 
analyses • 
1 1 . First , the interval of estimation { five years)  is the longest 
possible yielding stationary parameter estimates for the market 
model . Use of a longer estimation period woul d violate 
empirically demonstrated pooling restrictions consistent with 
stock return data { Gibbons, 1 980) , Second, quite often 
individual securities are not traded regularly on a daily basis.  
This regularity , referred to as non-synchronous trading, can 
cause biases in the parameters of the market model when estimated 
using daily data {Dimson, 1 97 9 ) , The use of weekly return data 
{ the geometric accumul ation of daily data over a seven day 
period ) minimizes the biases associated with infrequent trading. 
Third , recent empirical work demonstrates the presence of day-
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of-the�week effects in daily stock return data ( Gibbons and Hess,  
1 981) . For several days dummy variables for the day-of-the-week 
are significant explanatory variables in a market model . Agai n, 
the use of weekly data minimizes the chance that changes 
associated with an antitrust challenge are spurious and due to a 
day of the week effect . And fourth , often studies employing the 
information event methodology detect abnormal stock returns prior 
to the formal announcement of the event . That is,  information 
leakage is often exhibited in such studies . The use of weekly 
data together with the placement of the first information event 
day at the end of the first information event week permits 
detection of abnormal returns prior to the announcement . This 
detection is limited to six calendar days ,  however .  Since there 
is a no � priori method to determine the existence or structure 
of the information leakage, further efforts to account for it are 
not undertaken.  
The estimation of system ( 1 )  also recognizes a potential 
econometric exigency . The coefficients ( a  • •  , p  • •  , y  • •  ) of the 
system are estimated j oi ntly using Z ellner ' s  Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression Model ( SURM) ( Schipper and Thompson, 1 983 ; and Binder, 
1 985 ) . This technique accounts for the fact that there are 
common, industry-specific variables omitted from both equations. 
Although the estimated coefficients of SURM and ordinary least 
squares are identical when the same independent variables are 
contained in each equation, as is the case in system ( 1) ,  tests 
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of statistical significance utilize the additional information 
contained in the covariance of the disturbance terms across 
equations. SURM assumes that these disturbances are independent 
and identically distributed within each equation and that , across 
equations, only the contemporaneous covariance of the disturbance 
terms is non-zero . These assumptions are consistent with 
observed stock market r eturn data. 
The specification of system ( 1 ) also distinguishes 
between two sources of potential stock return effects pursuant to 
the antitrust challenge . Changes in regul ation, such as 
antitrust enforcement , can effect the stochastic properties of a 
security or portfolio of securities ( Pel tzman, 1 97 6 ) . 
Consequently, the parameters of the market model may change as a 
result of the antitrust action. The dummy variables ni t  permit 
the parameters of the market model in system ( 1 ) to adj ust as a 
resul t of the i ,  i=l , • • •  , k, information events concerning the 
disposition of the antitrust action. Since a given nit equals
zero prior to the ith information event and one thereafter , the 
parameter estimates afi ' aci ' pfi ' and Pei represent changes in
the parameters of the market model due to the ith information 
event . By accounting for these changes ,  system ( 1 ) minimizes the 
possibility of interpreting changes in the stochastic properties 
of an individual security or portfolio of securities as changes 
in the future profits of these firms . 
1 2 .  An appropriate statistic for this test i s  F ( 2m , 2 n-2q )  where m is 
the number of types of information (NEGt, POSt) ' n is the number
of return observations ( 260) and q the number of independent 
variables in each equation (Theil 1 971 , p. 314) . Binder ( 1 985 ) 
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provides evidence that for certain n and q ,  F( 2m , 2n-2q) is biased 
against the null hypothesis .  However , the bias is  negligible for 
values of n and q considered in this study . Binder also provides 
an analysis of alternative statistics . 
13 . The results of capital market analyses are typically summarized 
by averaging the abnormal returns across observations in the 
sample ( e .g . , Dodd and Warner, 1 983 ) .  The value of this 
construction depends , of course , on the hypotheses being tested. 
When there are diverse theoretical effects which , in a cross-
section, can hold simultaneously , such a test is of l ittle value . 
This is the case in the current study . 
14 . Most retailers, of course , never sell in national markets. The
dealer concentration data used in this analysis pertains to the
national level . These data represent a first-order approximation
to local concentration measures since they are simply local
measures averaged across the nation. Moreover , the
correspondence between a manufacturing industry and the relevant
distribution industry is not explicit . The author relied on
years of personal shopping experience to create this
correspondence .
1 5 . The expression for 8logp1/alogDC i s  derived t o  illustrate this
procedure. The derivative of the two equations in system ( 2) 
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with respect to logDC yields alogp1/alogDC - 8logp3 /a logDC = &11
and a1ogp2/alogDC - alogp3 /alogDC = &21 • Clearly , there are 
three unknowns and only two equations. The derivative of 
�
�=lpi = 1 yields the third equation. This derivative is equal
to ( 8logp1/alogDC)p1 , + ( 8logp2/alogDC)p2 
+ ( a logp3/alogDC )p3 = O ,  where pi , i=l , 2 , 3 , are the cross­
sectional means . Recursive substitution yields 
a1ogp1/alogDC = &11 <P2+P3 > - &21P2 · Thus , the elasticity between
the four-firm measure of concentration in the distributing 
industry and the probability that a dealers ' cartel rationale 
A - -underlies the r is equal to &11 C p2+p3 ) - &21p2 •  The calculations 
for the other two elasticities of relevance for testing the RPM 
hypotheses are alogp2/alogMC = &22Cp1+p3 ) - &12p1 and 
a1ogp3/alogSH = -&13P1 - &23P2 •
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APPENDIX 
Table A , 1  lists the complaints used in the current study . 
This table also lists information pertaining to the construction of 
the capital market analyses for these complaint s .  
The significance and assessment of the estimation results of 
system ( 1 ) for one observation in the sample are presented to 
illustrate the implementation and usefulness of the empirical 
formulation developed above.  The case chosen for this illustration is 
the Federal Trade Commission y. Lenox. This case is chosen because i t  
demonstrates many of the features o f  system ( 1 ) . This case is also 
discussed and analyzed in greater detail elsewhere ( Goldberg, 1 980; 
and Marvel and Mccafferty , 1 984 ) . 
Table A . 2  contains the information events used in the 
estimation of system ( 1 ) for FTC . y. Lenox . This table identifies the 
dates and type of information considered. Three of the events used in 
this case are deemed t o  increase the expected distribution costs or 
reduce the probabil ity that RPM remains a marke ting practice of Lenox. 
One event is  classified as increasing the probabil ity that RPM is 
continued .  Table A. 3 contains the names o f  firms whose securities are 
i ncluded in the compe ti tors portfol io . These are firms whose 
securities are listed on the CRSP tape for the five-year period 
surrounding the antitrust action and whose primary SIC is the same as 
Lenox ' s .  Finally, Table A. 4 presents the SURM estimates o f  system ( 1 )  
for FTC y Lenox . The t-statistics are reported below each parameter . 
Notice that since there are four information events , there are four 
TABLE A. 1 
SAMPLE OF ANTITRUST COMPLAINTS AGAINST RPM 
# of Firms in 
Competi tor ' s  
Name of Upstream Firm � of Suit Portfolio 
American Oil ( Standard of Indiana) FTC 3 2  
Beech Aircraft JD 3 
Bulova Watch FTC 6 
Clark Oil Private 3 2  
Col t Industries FTC 2 
Corning Glass Works FTC 3 
Crown Central Petrol eum FTC 3 2  
Dejur-AMSCO FTC 1 1  
D u  Pont JD 9 
Dymo Industries JD 1 4  
Ehrenreich JD 1 
Gamble-Skogmo FTC 1 7  
General Electric JD 3 
General Motors JD 4 
B . F .  Goodrich JD 1 0  
Hammermill Paper FTC 2 
Inter co FTC 5 
Lenox FTC 3 
Head Ski FTC 3 
Levi Strauss FTC 7 
Jonathan Logan FTC 17  
Lowenstein and Sons JD 1 
Signal Cor p .  ( Mack Trucks ) JD 1 9  
Magnavox FTC 7 
Max Factor JD 1 4  
Medalist Industries FTC 1 0  
Monsanto Private 1 
Olin Ski FTC 4 
Palm Beach FTC 3 
Piper Aircraft JD 3 
Charles Pfizer JD 1 4  
Quaker State JD 32  
Revlon JD 1 4  
Rubbermaid FTC 1 6  
Schl itz FTC 4 
Seagrams JD 7 
Shell Oil Private 32  
Simmons JD 3 
Sony Private 13  
Sohio JD 3 2  
Sun Oil Private 3 2  
Tandy Private 1 
Union on Private 32  
Wayne JD 1 
Wolverine JD 3 
# of 
Information 
events 
3 
2 
1 
3 
1 
5 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
2 
1 
1 
4 
1 
4 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
3 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
4 
2 
2 
2 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
News Date 
1 0/20/66 
6 /  8/ 67 
4/ 2 9/ 6 8  
1 0/ 17 / 6 9  
TABLE A . 2  
FTC . v .  Lenox 
Information Events 
News Summary 
Alleged to violate FTC 
Act by fixing and 
maintaining prices a t  
which i t s  china 
dinnerware and other 
products are retailed by 
franchised dealers . 
FTC Examiner ruled firm 
illegally fixed retail 
prices at which fine 
china dinnerware is sold 
by franchised dealers . 
FTC orders firm to stop 
fixing prices of 
products at retail . 
Appeals court lifted an 
FTC prohibition against 
price contracts between 
firm and dealers . 
TABLE A . 3  
FTC v .  Lenox 
Competitor ' s  Portfolio 
Anchor Hocking Corporation 
Corning Glass Works 
General Steel Inds . ,  Inc . 
Classification 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Positive 
Rft
Rot 
+ 
. 0001 3 8  
( . 0223 ) 
. 0087740 4t( 1 . 1 120) 
.613  005D2 tRmt( .  801 5 )  
- . 045723NEGt ( 1 . 7 7 88)  
. 004622 
( 1 . 6122)  
- . 004433D4t
( 1 . 2 1 20 
. 17 4051D2tRmt( . 4908) 
- . 009626NEGt 
( . 8077 )  
SYSTEM R-SQUARE :  
"' 
TABLE A. 4 
FTC v .  Lenox 
SURM Estimates 
+ . 006 81 5Dlt( . 6 43 3 )  
+ 1 . 0 845Rmt( 3 . 06 82 )  
. 3 3 07 86D3 tRmt ( . 5 84 8 )  
. 007 088POSt ( . 1 56 0) 
- . 007 0376Dlt
( 1 . 43 27 )  
+ . 96 6 524Rmt
( 5 . 8 97 5 )  
+ . 1213 7 9D3 tRmt
( . 46 2 9 )  
- . 07 0347POSt ( 3 . 3 3 97 )  
. 41 1 9  
H : 
0 
y ij 
= O ,  for all i , j 
F-VALUE : 3 . 8225 
P-LEVEL : . 0045 
+ , 00877 45D2t - . 008613D3 t( .  81 51 ) ( 1 . 0499)  
. 1 3 1 52 8DltRmt( . 1 87 2 )  
. 3 5427 9D4tRmt ( .  86 82 )  
+ , 0026050D2t + . 0008486D3 t( . 5219)  ( . 2231 ) 
+ . 1 803 05DltRmt 
( . 55 9 7 )  
+ .27 6 854D4tRmt 
( 1 . 46 3 4 )  
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Di t '  Recall that these dummy variables, which are equal to zero prior
to the ith information event and one thereafter , permit the i ntercept 
parameter ( a )  and the coefficient on the return to the market 
portfolio < P >  to change with each information event . Notice also that 
since three of the information events reflect negatively and one 
positively on the continued legal viability of RPM for Lenox, both 
NEG t and POSt are included in the estimation.
How important was the practice of RPM to Lenox and its 
compe titors? How valid are the assumptions employed in this empirical 
formul ation for analyzing the effects of FTC y. Lenox? An analysis of 
the statistical significance of the abnormal return parameters of 
system ( 1 )  reflects j ointly on these questions. In the three weekly 
periods in which news impinging on the legal viabil i ty of Lenox ' s  
marketing practice of RPM occurred , the return o n  its securities was 
4 . 57 percent lower than the average r eturn over the 2 56 periods in the 
estimation interval in which no anti trust information occurred. The 
return to Lenox ' s  competitors over these event periods was . 96 percent 
lower than on average . Neither of these differences by themselves was 
statistically different from zero at the five percent level . In the 
one week period in which news facil itating Lenox ' s  RPM practice 
occurred , the return on its securities was , 7 1  percent lower while 
Lenox ' s  competitors ' returns were 7 . 0 percent lower . The decline in 
the compe titor ' s  returns was highly significant. A test of the null 
hypothesis that all of the abnormal return parameters of the system 
are equal to zero yields an F-statistic of 3 . 8225 which is significant 
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at  the . 0045 probabili ty level . Thus , it does appear as though FTC y. 
Lenox had some measurable effect on the future profits of Lenox and 
its competitor s .  
The posterior probability that each o f  the alternative 
A 
rationales for RPM underlies the r of system ( 1 )  for FTC y, Lenox may 
be calculated using Bayes Theorem ,  the assumption that the elements of 
A A
r are independent and N ( y , a  ) ,  and assuming equal priors . The r 
A 
likelihood that a dealers ' cartel underlies the y is equal to the 
A A 
probability that rfl > O and yf2 < O times 1/ 3 ,  the inverse of the
number of theories consistent with the parameter estimates of the 
A 
second equa tion. The probabil ity that rfl > o is equal to . 03 7 6  and 
A 
the probability that yf2 < O is equal to . 56 20 .  Thus , the likel ihood
A 
that a dealer s '  cartel underlies y is . 007 1 .  Conversely , the 
A 
likelihood that a manufacturers ' cartel underl ies r is equal to the 
A A A A 
probability that rfl < O and yf2 > O times rcl < O and rc2 > o. These
probabil ities are equal to . 9624 , . 43 80 ,  . 7 904,  and . 0004 , 
respectively , Thus , the likelihood that a manufacturers ' cartel 
A 
underlies r is . 0001 . And final ly, the likelihood that a transaction 
A 
costs rationale underlies the y of system ( 1 ) for FTC y, Lenox is 
equal to the probability that rfl < O and rf2 > O times the
probability that ycl > 0 and rc2 < O. These probabilities are equal
to . 9624,  . 43 80 ,  . 2096 , and . 9996 , respectively.  Thus , the likel ihood 
A 
that a transaction costs rationale underlies r is . 08 83 . The 
posterior probabil ities of the al ternative theories are simply the 
normalized likelihoods given equal prior s .  Thus, 
49 
p1 = . 07 4 ,  p2 = . 001 , and p3 = . 92 5  where p1 , p2 , and p3 are the 
A 
posterior probabil ities that the y are generated in regimes consistent 
with a deal ers ' cartel , manufacturers ' cartel , and transaction costs 
applications of RPM, respectively. The evidence from the capital 
market suggests that the most likely rationale for R PM in the case of 
Lenox was to enhance efficiency in product distribution. 
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